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MODERNISATION OF EUROPEAN UNION C0MPET1TI0N LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
1. EU competition law has three main elements:
-  a prohibition on anti-competitive agreements -  Article 81 of 
the Treaty of Romé (ex Article 85)
-  a prohibition on abuses of a dominant position -  Article 82 
of the Treaty of Romé (ex Article 86)
-  a system of merger control -  the Merger Control 
Regulation, No 4064/89.
2. The procedúrái rules fór applying each of these elements are cur- 
rently being reformed. At present, the rules fór applying Articles 
81 and 82 are contained in Regulation 17, which came intő force 
in 1962. These rules, which are now over 40 years old, are out of 
date. The EU’ s Council of Ministers is expected to adopt a new 
regulation at its meeting on 26е*1 November 2002 in Brussels. This 
process of reform is referred to as the „modemisation" of EU 
competition law. The new regulation will come intő effect on lst 
January 2004, and so will be in force when Hungary joins the Eu.
3. The Merger Control Regulation is alsó being amended. The pro- 
posals were announced by Professor Mario Monti, the European 
Commissioner fór Competition, on 7th November 2002. They will 
be brought intő effect in 2003.
II. MODERNISATION OF ARTICLES 81 AND 82
4. Modemisation will nőt affect the substance of Articles 81 and 82. 
These will continue to provide as follows:
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A rtic le  81
(1) The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the com- 
mon markét:
all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associa- 
tions of undertakings and concerted practices which may 
affect trade between Member States and which have as their 
object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of 
competition within the common markét, and in particular 
those which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any 
other trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical develop- 
ment, or investment;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions 
with other trading parties, thereby piacing them at a compet- 
itive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by 
the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by 
their natúré or according to commercial usage, have no con- 
nection with the subject of such contracts.
(2) Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article 
shall be automatically void.
(3) The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapp- 
licable in the case of:
-  any agreement or category of agreements between under­
takings;
-a n y  decision or category of decisions by associations of 
undertakings;
-a n y  concerted practice or category of concerted practices, 
which contributes to improving the production or distribu- 
tion of goods or to promoting technical or economic 
progress, which allowing consumers a fair share of the 
resulting benefit, and which does nőt:
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(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which 
are nőt indispensable to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating 
competition in respect of a substantial part of the products in 
question
Article 82
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position 
within the common markét or in a substantial part of it shall be pro- 
hibited as incompatible with the common markét insofar as it may 
affect trade between Member States.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling 
prices or other unfair trading conditions;
(b) limiting production, markets or technical development to 
the prejudice of consumers;
(c) applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions 
with other trading parties, thereby piacing them at a compe- 
titive disadvantage;
(d) making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance 
by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by 
their natúré or according to commercial usage, have no con- 
nection with the subject of such contracts.
5. There will be three main procedúrái changes:
-  who enforces Article 81 (3)
-  ЕС competition law to have primacy, except fór purely 
national agreements and practices
-  „federal” approach to enforcement by the Commission and 
national competition authorities.
Who enforces Article 81(3)
6. Until now, only the European Commission has had the power to 
enforce Article 81(3). That means that where an agreement 
restricted. competition, bút did so to achieve benefits in accor-
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dance with Article 81 (3), only the European Commission had the 
power to grant exemption to the agreement. This required that 
the agreement be notified to the European Commission fór aspe- 
cifíc exemption.
7. This obviously caused a huge workload fór the European 
Commission. It attempted to deal with the problem by making 
„block exemptions" (alsó known as „group exemptions") fór 
defined categories of agreement. However, the reál world does 
nőt fit neatly intő defined categories and many agreements con- 
tinued to fali outside these block exemptions. They continued to 
need individual exemption.
8. This was an impractical system even before the UK became a 
member of the EU in 1973 when there were only 6 EU Member 
States. Now there are going to be 25 Member States it is obvious­
ly unworkable, and has been abandoned.
9- Under the new system, it is fór national courts and competition 
authorities to decide in any particular case whether an agree­
ment complies with Article 81(3). This is similar to the way in 
which they currently have powers to decide whether a practice is 
an abusé of a dominant position under Article 82.
10. To take a typical example, if the parties to a contract are in dis- 
pute and one alleges that the agreement infringes Article 81 (1), 
and so restrictions in it are void and cannot be enforced, it will 
be possible fór the other party to convince the court that the 
agreement, even if it does infringe Article 81 (1), complies with 
the requirements of Article 81(3). Previously, the court could nőt 
make a decision on that point and the case might have had to be 
suspended while the European Commission made a decision on 
this question.
11. In my view, this is a sensible and long overdue reform. It makes 
the enforcement of Article 81 much more similar to the way in 
which the equivalent US legislation, section 1 of the Sherman Act 
1890, is enforced.
P r im a e r  o f  ЕС la tv
12. It is obvious that national competition law cannot permit an 
agreement or practice which is prohibited by EU competition
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law. This would be contrary to the fundamental constitutional 
principle of the supremacy of EU law.
13 - A much more difficult question is whether national competition 
law can prohibit an agreement or practice which is permitted 
under EU competition law. The European Commission would 
like the answer to this question to be „no". However, somé 
Member States want to have this power.
14. It is nőt yet clear exactly how the Modernisation Reguládon will 
finally answer this question: this is one of the most difficult areas 
to be decided at the EU Council meeting on 26th November 
2002. It seems possible that a compromise will be negotiated 
under which national competition law cannot prohibit an agree­
ment or practice permitted by EU competition law, bút other 
national laws may still apply. The difficulty with such a compro­
mise is to decide what is meant by a national „competition" law. 
Fór example, is a law against misleading advertising a competi­
tion law -  because it certainly affects how businesses compete 
with each other.
15. Alsó, it will become very important to know whether EU law 
actually applies to an agreement or practice. The EU jurisdiction- 
al test -  equivalent to the inter -  State commerce test in the cons- 
titution of the USA -  is whether there is an effect on trade 
between Member States. The European Commission will publish 
a Notice on this test in 2003. The impact of the test varies 
depending on the geographic location of each Member State. In 
the UK, it is often harder to show an effect on trade -  because it 
is an island nation. By contrast, Hungary will have more land 
borders with EU Member States than the UK or the Nordic States.
F ederal approach  to  enforcem ent
16. Finally, the main reason given by the European Commission fór 
ending the system of individual exemptions under Article 81(3) 
is so that they can devote more resources to enforcing Articles 81 
and 82 in cases which are of major EU signfficance. Accordingly, 
the European Commission wants to co-ordinate with Member 
States’ competition authorities so that cases that affect only one 
or two Member States are dealt with at national level. The
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European Commission plans only to investigate cases where 
there is an effect on at least three Member States.
17. As a result, the Modernisation Reguládon will give national com- 
petition authorities the powers to apply Articles 81 and 82, as 
well as their own national competition legislation.
C onclusion on  M odern isation
18. When Hungary joins the EU, it will be in a very different posi- 
tion in relation to competition law to that which the BK found 
itself when it joined in 1973- At that time, European competition 
law was seen as being of little importance and was, in any event, 
something that only happened in Brussels.
19- Now, competition law is clearly of fundamental importance to 
the European Union. Moreover, it is a body of law which is 
applied and enforced by every competition authority in the 
European Union as well as by the European Commission itself. 
It is alsó law which can be relied upon in every court in the 
European Union. No commercial lawyer in the European Union 
can afford to ignore the .potential implications of Articles 81 and 
82 fór the businesses which they advise
III. REFORM OF THE MERGER CONTROL REG UIA TION
20. The European Merger Control Regulation governs the largest 
mergers, measured by turnover, in the European Union. If the 
size o f the merger does nőt cross certain thresholds -  such as the 
combined turnover being in excess of 5 billión euros -  then 
national merger laws apply and EU law does nőt. Obviously, it 
will be unusual fór a commercial lawyer to be dealing with cases 
falling under the Merger Control Regulation on a regular basis, 
unless the lawyer works fór one of the large law firms specialis- 
ing in this area.
21. I do nőt intend, therefore, to cover the Merger Control 
Regulation in this talk. I will, however, note the main changes 
which are proposed by Commissioner Monti as this may be of 
interest to those advising in the merger field.
22. There will be no change from the current dominance test to the 
„substantial lessening of competition" (SLC) test, bút there will
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be clarification in the ECMR that the Commission will assess 
whether a transaction leads to both single firm dominance and 
whether there are „unilateral effects" in situations of oligopoly.
23. There will be a Commission Notice on the assessment of domi­
nance in horizontal mergers, and Commission Notices on verti- 
cal and conglomerate effects will follow. The first Notice will 
include guidelines on when factors such as buyer power, ease of 
markét entry and efficiencies can be considered to.mitigate the 
anticompetitive effects of a merger.
24. The Commission will expressly recognise that efficiencies argu- 
ments will be taken intő account in its assessment of a merger, 
although the parties as will have to prove that the efficiencies 
will directly benefit consumers, as well as being merger-specific, 
timely and verifiable. The draft guidelines will indicate that it is 
very unlikely that efficiencies could be accepted as süfficient to 
permit a merger leading to monopoly or quasi-monopoly to be 
cleared.
25. There will be a new position of Chief Competition Economist, 
directly attached to the Director General, to oversee the econo- 
mic analysis in all competition cases, and the Commission will 
extend the appointment of economists and the use of outside 
economic advisers. There will be a Panel review system in Phase 
II cases, whereby officials independent of the case team will scru- 
tinise cases at crucial points during the investigation, and a new 
Unit in DG Competition will be set up to administer the Panel.
26. Parties to a merger will be given earlier access to the fiié, as well 
as ad hoc access to third party views, subject to the protection of 
confidential information, where those views differ from the 
merging parties’ views. Merging parties will alsó be able to have 
a meeting with complaining third parties before a Statement of 
Objections is issued. Merging parties will be able to attend State 
of play meetings with the Commission at decisive points in the 
case.
27. The role of the hearing officers will be strengthened, and they 
will be given more resources to enable them to be effective. The 
Commission will alsó enhance the input of consumers in the
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merger review process, by establishing a consumer liaison func- 
tion to involve consumer bodies in the review of cases.
28. On timing, merging parties will be able to request a further 
three weeks in Phase II proceedings following the submission of 
an offer of remedies. Four weeks will alsó be able to be added to 
Phase II proceedings at the request of the parties or at the 
request of the Commission, in the latter case with the consent of 
the parties, where the evidential burden of the Commission in 
the case warrants the extension.
29- The parties to a mergers will be able to notify a transaction prior 
to the conclusion of an agreement, and the current one-week 
deadline will be abolished, so long as the parties do nőt comp- 
lete the transaction before they obtain clearance.
30. The proposed reforms should greatly improve the effectiveness 
of the ЕС merger control system, in terms of substance and pro- 
cedure, whilst maintaining the benefits of the „one-stop shop” 
established by the ECMR.
31. However, the Commission has clearly tried to respond positive- 
ly to the need to improve in particular its economic analysis of 
merger cases and the transparency of its merger control pro­
ceedings, in the light of the recent judgments of the Court of 
First Instance on the Commission’s Merger Decisions in 
AirTours/First Choice, Scheider/Legrand and Tetra Laval/Sidel.
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